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UNDERSTANDING AUTOMATION SURPRISE: ANALYSIS OF ASRS REPORTS 
 
Julia Trippe & Robert Mauro 
Decision Research 
Eugene, Oregon 
 
Pilots are frequently surprised by aircraft automation. These include cases in which the 
automation: 1) produces alerts to anomalies, 2) commands unexpected control manipulations (that 
may result in flight path deviations), or 3) simply disconnects. Aviation Safety Reporting System 
(ASRS) reports in which pilots indicated that automation produced unexpected actions were 
analyzed.  Three general conclusions were drawn.   First, many factors precipitate automation 
surprises.  These include problems in: the auto-flight system and associated displays and 
interfaces, other aircraft sensors and systems, and interactions with weather and ATC. Second, 
inappropriate pilot actions are involved in a large proportion of these events.  Third, recovery need 
not require reversion to manual control.  There is no single general intervention that can prevent 
automation surprise or completely mitigate its effects.  However, several different tacks (including 
improved training, displays, and coordination with ATC) taken together may be effective. 
 
 The capabilities of automated flight systems increased rapidly following the introduction of the electronic 
autopilot in the 1940’s. In normal operations, the automated flight system of the modern airliner can now control 
nearly all functions required for flight. The effect of increased automation has been largely positive, greatly reducing 
errors due to pilot fatigue and allowing consistent precise navigation and performance. However, automation has 
given rise to new problems caused by faulty interactions between the pilot and the auto-flight system (AFS). This 
class of problems has been variously termed lack of mode awareness (Javaux and De Keyser, 1998), mode 
confusion (Degani, Shafto, & Kirlik, 1999), and automation surprise (Winter & Curry 1989; Woods, Sarter, and 
Billings, 1997, Burki-Cohen, 2010). In these cases, the flight crew expects the automation to command one behavior 
and is surprised when it commands another. When they do not jeopardize flight safety, automation surprises are a 
nuisance. But when the automation commands an aircraft trajectory that violates airspace or operational limitations, 
automation surprise becomes a critical problem (Reveley et al, 2010). 
 
 Automation surprise may result from undetected failures in aircraft sensors or other systems. Automation 
surprise also may result from pilots having an inadequate or mistaken “mental model” of the machine’s behavior in 
the operational environment (Sarter and Woods, 1995). In addition, automation surprise may result from a 
problematic interface that does not provide adequate information about the status of the machine (Feary et al 1998; 
Norman, 1990, Degani, Shafto, and Kirlik, 1999).  
 
 Pilot lore is replete with complaints of flight management systems misbehaving. Flight management 
computers can appear to be pernicious allies that on occasion unilaterally decide to “drop” fixes, void altitude 
restrictions, or change modes of operation. For the most part the result of these events are relatively benign. No 
metal is bent; no one is injured; no lives are lost. But this is not always the case. Unexpected behaviors of the auto-
flight system have been implicated in a number of recent fatal accidents (Sherry & Mauro, 2014).  Furthermore, 
these events increase pilot workload, setting the stage for other errors. They create inefficiencies for the aircraft 
directly involved and may disrupt the flow of air traffic as controllers vector other aircraft to accommodate the 
aircraft whose crew is dealing with the unexpected behavior. To prevent or mitigate the effects of these “automation 
surprises” one must first understand why they occur. 
 
 People are surprised when they expect one event but another occurs. So, to understand automation surprise, 
one must ask why the behavior of the auto-flight system was not expected. Based on their training and experience, 
pilots build an understanding (a “mental model”) of how their automation functions. Selected information about the 
current status of the aircraft, including its automation, is interpreted in the context of this mental model to build a 
mental representation of what the aircraft is currently doing and what it will do next.  Hence, to be surprised, either 
the information fed into the mental model is inaccurate or the model itself is wrong. Pilots’ expectations of what 
their automation will do may be in error when they attend to the wrong data, misinterpret data, or the data is in error. 
Alternately, their expectations may be wrong when their understanding of what the automation will do under the 
encountered conditions is wrong.  
 
 
 In this paper we examine pilot reports of unexpected automation behavior chronicled in the Aviation Safety 
Reporting System (ASRS) database in an effort to characterize the nature of these problems. Based on this 
understanding, technological and training strategies can be developed to prevent automation surprises and mitigate 
their effects. 
Methods 
 
 The ASRS database was searched for automation-related event reports from 2012 by crews operating under 
Part 121. The initial search criteria were broadly specified to minimize the likelihood that relevant reports would be 
missed. Reports that mentioned automation, autopilot, auto throttle, flight management system, flight management 
computer, flight data computer, mode control panel, LNAV, VNAV, or any of the common abbreviations for these 
devices were retrieved. Of the 558 reports obtained, 234 described an event in which the pilots were surprised by 
unexpected actions of the auto-flight system. 
 
 The events that transpired before, during, and after the surprise were coded. Distinctions were made 
between five categories of events (actions or circumstances): precipitating, contributing, problem, detection, and 
response.  Precipitating actions were those that preceded and led directly to the automation surprise. Within this 
category, we distinguished between primary precipitating or “catalytic” actions and secondary precipitating actions 
that occurred in response to the catalytic events. For example, in a number of cases, Air Traffic Control (ATC) 
instructions directed pilots to alter their previously programmed flight path. In entering flight path alterations into 
the flight management system (FMS), the pilots made an error that later resulted in a surprising aircraft behavior. 
We coded the ATC instructions as the primary or “catalytic” precipitating event and the pilot programming of the 
FMS as the secondary precipitating action. Contributing circumstances were those that did not directly precipitate 
the automation surprise but that may have contributed to the problem. For example, pilots may have reported being 
rushed or fatigued during the operation. Problem actions were those that produced the surprise. For example, in the 
prototypical ATC precipitated event described above, the pilots were often surprised by the aircraft veering away 
from the intended course. In this case, the problem event was coded as a course deviation. Detection actions were 
those that led to the discovery of the problem. These actions could involve direct observation of the aircraft behavior 
(as in the example above) by the pilots or ATC or observation of messages (e.g., Electronic Caution Alert Module 
(ECAM)), alerts (e.g., autopilot disconnect), or control movements. Response actions were those taken to resolve or 
recover from the surprise. These included actions such as taking manual control of the aircraft, switching to a lower 
level of automation (e.g., from VNAV to Mode Control Panel (MCP) control), or notifying ATC of a deviation. For 
each of these “action” categories, we coded the nature of the event, when the action occurred (phase of flight), who 
performed the action (e.g., ATC, crew, AFS), and the level of automation in use. 
 
Results & Discussion 
 
What Was Surprising? 
 
 A variety of different automation-related events surprised crews (see Table 1). In 15% (35) of the cases, the 
crew was surprised by changes in auto-flight system operation, including shutdown or freezing of various AFS 
components. In 11 of these cases, the autopilot disconnected. In three cases, the auto throttle disengaged or 
otherwise behaved unexpectedly. In 10 cases an unexpected mode change occurred and in 11 cases some component 
of the auto-flight system froze or failed. 
 
In 12% (28) of the cases, the crew was surprised by the auto-flight system interface. Half (14) of these 
cases occurred when FMS data disappeared unexpectedly. In 73% (170) of the cases, the crew was surprised by 
aircraft behavior, including 21 cases in which the crew detected unexpected changes in aircraft control prior to a 
substantial change in aircraft position or velocity. However, in 64% (149) of all cases, the aircraft’s velocity or 
position was altered substantially without the crew noticing. Twenty-seven of these resulted in airspeed changes, 35 
in course alterations, 33 in altitude deviations and in 48 cases the aircraft’s vertical path was affected unexpectedly. 
  
 
Table 1. 
Surprising Automation-Related Events 
Event Type Percent (n) Event Type Percent (n) 
AFS operation only 15  (35) AFS problem affects aircraft control   9  (21) 
AFS Component Failure    4.7  (11) AFS problem affects aircraft behavior 64  (149) 
Auto Throttle   1.3   ( 3) Airspeed 11.5  (27) 
AP Disconnect   4.7  (11) Altitude 14.1  (33) 
Unexpected Mode Change   4.3  (10) Course 15.0  (35) 
AFS interface only 12  (28) Localizer   2.6   ( 6)   
Display   6.0  (14) Vertical Path 20.5  (48) 
FMS Drop   6.0  (14) Other   0  ( 1) 
Note.  N=234; number of cases in parentheses. 
  
When were crews surprised?  
 
 Overall, 55% of the automation surprises occurred during the arrival and approach phases of flight (see 
Table 2). By contrast, only 13% of the events occurred during cruise. However, this pattern differed according to the 
type of event. Failures or freezing of auto-flight system components, categorized as “AFS Component Failure” in 
Table 2, were evenly divided between climb, cruise, and approach. Two of the three auto-throttle events occurred in 
cruise. Although most of the autopilot disconnects, unexpected mode changes, and control anomalies occurred 
during arrival and approach, a substantial proportion occurred during climb and cruise. Display faults occurred 
equally during climb, cruise, and arrival. Waypoints dropping from FMS flight plans as well as lateral course 
deviations occurred mainly during climbs below 10,000 feet and arrival and approach phases. 
 
Table 2. 
Surprising Events by Phase of Flight 
 Problem Phase of Flight 
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AFS Component 0% 9% 18% 9% 27% 9% 0% 27% 0% 0% 11 
Auto Throttle 0% 0% 0% 0% 67% 0% 0% 0% 33% 0% 3 
AP Disconnect 0% 18% 0% 0% 27% 0% 36% 18% 0% 0% 11 
Mode Change 0% 0% 30% 0% 20% 0% 40% 10% 0% 0% 10 
Display 0% 14% 29% 0% 21% 0% 29% 7% 0% 0% 14 
FMS Drop 7% 7% 29% 7% 0% 0% 7% 36% 0% 7% 14 
Control 0% 0% 19% 10% 29% 5% 14% 19% 5% 0% 21 
Airspeed 0% 0% 15% 15% 15% 0% 11% 37% 7% 0% 27 
Altitude 0% 0% 0% 12% 3% 9% 36% 39% 0% 0% 33 
Course 0% 0% 37% 6% 14% 0% 20% 17% 0% 6% 35 
LOC 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 6 
Vertical Path 0% 0% 4% 0% 2% 15% 69% 10% 0% 0% 48 
Other 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 0% 1 
Total  0% 3% 15% 6% 13% 5% 31% 24% 2% 1% 234 
 
 There are several possible explanations for the disproportionate number of surprising events reported 
during the approach and arrival phases of flight. During these transitional phases crews are preparing for landing, 
 
traffic is increasing, and ATC often places additional demands on pilots. To comply with these demands, pilots 
make heavy use of their automation, resulting in discovery of automation problems that lay dormant during previous 
phases of flight. Furthermore, pilots may make errors while changing modes and programming flight plans. The 
ASRS reports provide indirect evidence for these explanations. Problems that are likely to be caused by issues with 
electronic components (e.g., AFS and display problems) were more likely than other problems (e.g., course or 
altitude deviations) to occur during cruise. This follows, given that electrical failures are likely to be dependent on 
the amount of time spent in operation, whereas flight path deviations are likely to occur when the aircraft is in 
proximity to other aircraft, and thus likely to be directed by ATC to change course or altitude. 
 
Proximal Precursors of Surprising Events 
 
 Narratives of the ASRS reports were analyzed to determine the sequence of events that preceded the 
automation surprises. Sometimes, the pilots described probable causal sequences. This was particularly likely when 
the pilots determined that their actions had led to the surprise. In other cases, analysts could reasonably infer an 
event sequence based on pilots’ descriptions of their actions and the automation response in combination with 
knowledge of AFS operations. Problems attributed to malfunctioning automation components rarely contained 
sufficient information to verify this conclusion. In many of these cases, pilots reported contacting maintenance, but 
rarely reported ensuing findings. 
 
 A precipitating event could not be determined with sufficient confidence in 21 of the examined cases. Of 
the remaining 213 cases, 66% (140) involved human errors in auto-flight system operation (see Table 3). Pilot 
actions engendered the majority of airspeed (64%), altitude (84%), course (71%), localizer (60%), and vertical path 
(73%) surprises. Pilot actions also led to the majority of surprises resulting from auto-flight system problems, 
control manipulations, display problems, unexpected mode changes, and dropped waypoints. However, in 24% of 
cases the AFS or another technological system was apparently responsible for triggering the surprise. This includes 
two out of three auto throttle changes, the majority (80%) of the autopilot disconnect events, and a large proportion 
of the auto-flight problems (44%), control manipulations (44%), display problems (38%), and mode changes (33%).  
 
Table 3. 
Surprising Event by Source of Event 
Surprising  
Event 
Source of Event 
Pilots Environment AFS Other System Other Total N 
AFS Problem 44% 0% 33% 11% 11% 9 
Airspeed 64% 28% 8% 0% 0% 25 
Altitude 84% 3% 6% 3% 3% 31 
Auto Throttle 33% 0% 67% 0% 0% 3 
Control 44% 11% 22% 22% 0% 18 
Course 71% 0% 17% 6% 6% 35 
AP Disconnect 20% 0% 20% 60% 0% 10 
Display 54% 0% 23% 15% 8% 13 
FMS Drop 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 11 
LOC 60% 40% 0% 0% 0% 5 
Mode Change 56% 11% 33% 0% 0% 9 
Vertical Path 73% 2% 18% 2% 5% 44 
Total 66% 7% 16% 8% 3% 213 
 
As noted above, 66% of the surprising events were precipitated by pilot actions. However, these actions were 
unabetted in only a small proportion (28%) of these cases. In the remaining 72% of these cases, pilot actions were 
triggered by external events. In 52% of the cases (73), pilots were attempting to comply with ATC instructions when 
they inadvertently triggered the unexpected automation response. In the remaining 20% of cases, pilots were 
attempting to cope with equipment issues when they inadvertently triggered an unexpected automation action. 
 
 
 
 
Detection 
 
 In general (78% of the time), pilots were the first to detect the surprising events. However, ATC detected 
the problems simultaneously or before the pilots in 20% of the cases. In 36% of altitude deviation cases, ATC 
detected the deviation simultaneously (12%) or before (24%) the pilots. In 69% of course deviation cases, ATC 
detected the deviation simultaneously (6%) or before (63%) the pilots. In 12% of vertical path deviations, ATC 
detected the deviation before the pilots.  
 
Resolution 
 
 The automation level at which the aircraft was being operated at the time of the surprising event was 
compared to the automation level during resolution of the event. In 34 cases the automation during one period or the 
other could not be determined with reasonable certainty. In 48% of the cases (95), the same level of automation was 
maintained throughout the reported event. In 45% of the cases (90) in which the aircraft was being flown under 
some level of automation, pilots resorted to manual control following the surprising event. In the remaining 55% of 
the cases (110) automation was used in the recovery. When VNAV was in use at the time of the surprising event (72 
cases), pilots resolved the issues and continued under VNAV 32% of the time. In the remaining VNAV cases, 22% 
of the crews used MCP inputs to control the aircraft and 42% resorted to manual control. When LNAV was in use at 
the time of the surprising event (36 cases), the pilots continued to fly using LNAV 56% of the time. In 14% of the 
cases they relied on the MCP. In 22% of LNAV cases, pilots resorted to manual control. When the aircraft was 
being controlled using the MCP at the time of the event (28 cases), pilots continued to fly using the MCP in 64% of 
the cases and resorted to manual control 32% of the time. 
 
General Discussion 
 
 Three important conclusions can be drawn from the results discussed above.  First, many different factors 
may precipitate automation surprises. These include problems in the auto-flight system, problems in the displays and 
interface with the automation, problems in other aircraft sensors and systems, interactions with weather and other 
aspects of the external environment, and inappropriate actions taken by the pilots. Second, inappropriate actions by 
the pilots are involved in a large proportion of the automation surprise events. Third, recovery from automation 
surprises need not require reversion to manual control. In many cases, pilots continued to fly successfully using the 
same level of automation used prior to the automation surprise. Based on these observations, it is clear that there is 
no single general intervention that can prevent automation surprise or completely mitigate its effects. However, 
several different tacks taken together may be particularly effective.  
 
 First, new methods for pilot automation training need to be developed and tested. A large portion of the 
reported automation surprises can be traced to inappropriate pilot actions. In some cases, pilots understood what had 
happened after the fact. In other cases they did not, but probable causes of the surprises were apparent in their 
reports. Providing pilots with a better understanding of their automation would likely decrease the number of 
surprises. Producers of automated systems have long touted their ability to simplify pilots’ tasks and improve 
precision and efficiency. However, researchers have repeatedly noted that while aviation automation has improved 
the efficiency and precision of operations, it has not reduced complexity. Indeed, automation has increased the 
complexity of the pilots’ job. Training has not kept pace. Methods for automation education need to be developed 
which can help pilots develop an understanding of their automation that allows them to anticipate automation 
actions and not simply respond with a small set of canned procedures.1 For pilots to construct adequate mental 
models of automation, they do not need to know the intricacies of the underlying engineering, but they must know 
how the system interacts with the environment – how it obtains information, what it controls, and what targets it is 
trying to achieve. Hence, pilots must be trained to understand: 1) what is controlled by each automation mode, 2) 
where each mode obtains data about the current state of the aircraft, 3) where each mode obtains targets, and 4) what 
actions each mode will take when the target is achieved. But having this knowledge is not sufficient. It merely 
provides the framework for the model. At every point during a flight, the model must be populated with current 
information about the state of the aircraft and how it relates to the intended flight path. This requires that pilots: 1) 
1 One area of particular difficulty appears to be the interaction between the auto-flight functions controlled through 
the mode control panel and those controlled by the flight control computer through a display unit. 
 
                                                        
know where to find the relevant information, 2) attend to these sources, 3) interpret the information correctly, and 4) 
integrate this information with their stored knowledge of the automated flight system and intended flight path. 
 
 Second, improved displays need to be developed that provide pilots with predictive indications. In many 
ASRS cases, the automation performed as it had been programmed to perform. However, errors in the pilots’ 
programming or other inappropriate actions led to a discrepancy between what the pilots thought the system was 
programmed to do and what it was actually programmed to do. Typical automation interfaces do not provide clear 
displays of the programmed and predicted flight paths. Without this support, errors that humans inevitably make 
may go unnoticed until the aircraft is substantially off course, altitude, or airspeed. 
 
 Third, a large portion of pilot precipitated automation surprise events were themselves caused by 
instructions from ATC that proved problematic for pilots. A substantial decrease in the number of automation 
surprise events likely could be attained through restructuring ATC arrival and approach procedures. Decreasing the 
number of unnecessary “mission surprises” with which pilots must cope is likely to decrease the number of 
automation surprises. For example, new RNAV arrival procedures may be so complex that they cannot be reliably 
flown manually. However, ATC procedures allow controllers to vector aircraft into these procedures and to alter 
their components. Because these approaches effectively must be flown by the automation, modifications force pilots 
to program the FMS while flying the procedure. In this process, errors may be made that surprise the pilots and 
disrupt the flow of traffic. Modifying ATC procedures could substantially decrease the number of these problems. 
 
 The results reported here also underscore the importance of understanding and developing strategies for 
addressing the problem of automation surprise before NextGen becomes fully operational. In a large proportion of 
the cases examined, ATC called pilots’ attention to a deviation from the planned course or altitude. Frequently, ATC 
handled the problem by providing a new clearance. Under NextGen, aircraft may fly in close proximity along 
defined 4D paths. Deviations such as those observed here would bring aircraft dangerously close to one another. At 
best, these events would cause substantial disruption to the traffic flow. At worst, they could result in collisions. 
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